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Figure 1: MimicGAN is a fully unsupervised technique that can recover images from unknown corruptions by making
successive estimates on the corruption as well as the solution. It can solve challenging inverse tasks without task-specific
training (or data), and also outperform recent GAN-based defenses against several types of adversarial attacks.
Abstract
Solving inverse problems continues to be a central chal-
lenge in computer vision. Existing techniques either explic-
itly construct an inverse mapping using prior knowledge
about the corruption, or learn the inverse directly using
a large collection of examples. However, in practice, the
nature of corruption may be unknown, and thus it is chal-
lenging to regularize the problem of inferring a plausible
solution. On the other hand, collecting task-specific train-
ing data is tedious for known corruptions and impossible
for unknown ones. We present MimicGAN, an unsuper-
vised technique to solve general inverse problems based
on image priors in the form of generative adversarial net-
works (GANs). Using a GAN prior, we show that one can
reliably recover solutions to underdetermined inverse prob-
lems through a surrogate network that learns to mimic the
corruption at test time. Our system successively estimates
the corruption and the clean image without the need for su-
pervisory training, while outperforming existing baselines
in blind image recovery. We also demonstrate that Mimic-
GAN improves upon recent GAN-based defenses against
adversarial attacks and represents one of the strongest
test-time defenses available today.
1 Introduction
Recovering good approximations of an image given its
corrupted version is a widely studied problem in computer
vision. It falls into a broader class of under-determined
inverse problems, where a good solution requires us to
make informed guesses to compensate for missing infor-
mation. Formally, this refers to problems that take the
form Y = f(X) + η, wherein the goal is to recover a
This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department
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clean signal X from its noisy (η is a noise source), incom-
plete observation Y [24]. In computer vision, the mapping
f encompasses a wide range of deformation or corruption
functions [29, 22, 30, 9]. Existing solutions can be broadly
divided into two categories: (a) Explicit solutions which
assume knowledge of the corruption model, f ; and (b)
Implicit solutions that learn to approximate the inverse,
f†, using a large set of (X,Y ) pairs. The former class
of approaches are effective in practice, particularly when
suitable priors on the signal space are available (e.g. `1 or
total variation). In cases where the priors are not known,
recent approaches have adopted Generative Adversarial
Networks (GANs) [10] to regularize the inversion pro-
cess with a GAN prior instead [30, 22, 9]. While, explicit
methods, both traditional and GAN based, typically do
not require large databases of labeled examples, they do
leverage information about the known corruption model
which may not be available, i.e. in case of an unknown
sensor or uncertain physics process.
In contrast, the implicit approaches rely entirely on data-
driven inferencing (e.g. deep learning); examples include
reconstruction from compressed measurements [9, 14],
super-resolution [16], or CT image recovery from incom-
plete views [3] etc. While these implicit approaches elimi-
nate the need to characterize the hypothesis space of cor-
ruptions, or to define appropriate signal priors, the result-
ing solutions are highly specific to the trained task, and
their performance deteriorates when sufficient number of
training observations are not available. Both explicit and
implicit methods fail to deal with unknown corruptions,
a critical requirement when image classifiers are increas-
ingly deployed in the wild, where there is no a priori
knowledge about the image distortions that can potentially
make the classifier ineffective. Here, we seek a more real-
istic scenario where we neither have any knowledge about
the corruption f , nor have access to training examples. In
particular, we consider the important problems of blind
image recovery and defending against adversarial attacks.
We present MimicGAN, an unsupervised approach for
solving inverse problems, which utilizes a GAN prior
while also learning the corruption on the fly. There are
two main components in MimicGAN: (a) a pre-trained
GAN that can act as a prior for the signal space; and (b) a
surrogate neural network that attempts to estimate f given
few observations, and the best guess from a GAN prior.
Note that, the GAN is trained once offline on clean images,
while the surrogate only uses a small set of corrupted ob-
servations that are made available at test time. Therefore,
we never need training pairs (X,Y ) which is a significant
advantage, and results in a very general, task-agnostic ap-
proach. In contrast to implicit approaches that estimate the
inverse mapping f†, we attempt to generate the corrupted
observations by iteratively obtaining an approximation of
the clean images from the GAN prior, and an estimate of
the corruption from the surrogate, Y ≈ fˆ Xˆ . The inclusion
of a corruption-mimicking surrogate into the inversion pro-
cess acts as a regularizer when estimating the clean image
using the GAN. Surprisingly, this alternating optimization
is highly effective even for complex corruption functions,
which existing GAN prior-based methods fail to invert.
Figure 1 illustrates the effectiveness of MimicGAN in a
large class of blind image recovery problems. Using only
a small number of observations (as low as 25) at test time,
MimicGAN is able to determine highly plausible solutions,
while reasonably mimicking the actual corruption process.
Another important application of MimicGAN’s ability to
correct for unknown corruptions is in generating defenses
against adversarial attacks [11], i.e. quasi-imperceptible
perturbations designed to fool a classifier. We pose adver-
sarial defense as an image recovery problem, where we are
given images that have been altered by very specific per-
turbations. We report that for several popular attacks, the
MimicGAN defense achieves state-of-the-art performance,
when compared to existing GAN-based defenses [25, 12].
Impact: To the best of our knowledge, MimicGAN is
the first system capable of effectively recovering images
from such a diverse class of corruptions, without the need
to collect a large number of observations. While Mim-
icGAN eliminates the need to explicitly define suitable
signal priors, it also does not require knowledge about
the corruption, taking us a step closer towards a universal
solution for inverse problems. This can eventually lead to
the design of image recovery systems that can be deployed
as a pre-processing step for achieving robust classification
in the wild.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We propose MimicGAN, the first fully unsupervised
approach to solve challenging inverse problems, without
prior knowledge of the corruptions.
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2. We introduce a corruption-mimicking surrogate to the
inversion, improving the performance of existing GAN
based methods without additional supervision or data.
3. We demonstrate MimicGAN’s effectiveness on six chal-
lenging blind image recovery tasks using the CelebA
Faces dataset [17] with competitive results compared
to fully supervised techniques and significantly better
results than unsupervised baselines.
4. On the Fashion-MNIST [28] dataset we show that Mim-
icGAN significantly improves the robustness of pre-
trained classifiers to extreme corruptions.
5. Finally, we present the MimicGAN defense against ad-
versarial attacks on the Fashion-MNIST dataset and
show that it is the best test-time defense, against six
of the strongest attacks available today.
2 Related Work
GANs for Inverse Problems: With their ability to effec-
tively model high-dimensional distributions, GANs [10]
have enabled the use of unsupervised methods in inverse
problems. Yeh et al. [30] first introduced the projected
gradient descent (PGD) method with GANs for filling up
arbitrary holes in an image, in a semantically meaning-
ful manner. Subsequently, several efforts have pursued
solving inverse problems using PGD, for example com-
pressive recovery [6, 27], and deblurring [4]. Asim et
al. [4] proposed an alternative approach for image deblur-
ring, wherein they used two separate GANs – one for the
blur kernel, and another for the images. MimicGAN dif-
fers from this approach in that we make no assumptions on
the types of corruptions that can be recovered, and hence
requires only a single GAN for modeling the image man-
ifold. The corruption-mimicking proposed in this paper
is loosely related to the cyclical consistency used in the
CycleGAN architecture [13]; however with a crucial dif-
ference that [13] infers the forward and inverse mappings
between the two distributions together, thus requiring large
datasets in both domains. In contrast, our approach focuses
on image recovery scenarios, where very few examples
(for e.g. ∼ 25) are available.
AmbientGAN [7], is another related technique that allows
one to obtain a GAN in the original space given its lossy
measurements, which can be useful to obtain a GAN prior
even when clean images are not available. However, the
authors in [7] consider only inverse problems where the
form of corruption function is known a priori (e.g. random
binary mask). Whereas, MimicGAN uses a surrogate net-
work to emulate the corruption process, and can be applied
to observations from any arbitrary corruption function. Fi-
nally, our work improves on the notion of “GAN priors"
[30, 27, 4, 6] – the idea that optimizing in the latent space
of a pre-trained GAN provides a powerful prior to solving
several traditionally hard problems. As GANs become
better, we expect new capabilities in solving challenging
inverse problems to emerge.
GANs for Adversarial Defense: In addition to its effec-
tiveness for image recovery, the GAN-prior has also be-
come a reasonably successful way to defend against adver-
sarial attacks – which are small perturbations in the pixel
space that are designed to cause a particular classifier to
fail dramatically. For example, Defense-GAN [25], uses
an approach called clean and classify, where the observed
adversarial example is projected on to the image manifold,
with the hope of eliminating the adversarial perturbation
in the process. A very related idea is explored in [12],
referred as Invert and Classify (INC), which also relies
on PGD as in the case of Defense-GAN. Note that, both
Defense-GAN and MimicGANare applicable to white-box
as well as black-box attacks, since they do not need access
to the classifier model in order to clean the data. Another
related approach proposes to use the discriminator in addi-
tion to the generator to detect adversarial examples [26],
and we show in our experiments that, in comparison, the
MimicGAN defense is significantly more robust. Inter-
esting, all the three aforementioned approaches become a
special case of MimicGAN, when the surrogate network
in our approach is assumed to be identity. It should be
noted that most existing GAN based defenses are effective
only when the attack is designed purely on the classifier.
However, recent evidence shows that these defenses can
be broken when the attack is designed on the GAN and the
classifier together [5]. We observe that, the MimicGAN de-
fense is also vulnerable to such a GAN-based attack, but
to a lower degree than plain GAN-based defenses, and this
can be attributed to inclusion of the corruption-mimicking
process.
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(a) MimicGAN solves image recovery by alternating between the corruption and the solution.
(b) Quality of estimated solution vs. num-
ber of alternating optimization steps.
Figure 2: A demonstration of the proposed approach. We iteratively estimate the corruption and guess images from
the GAN. As the surrogate captures finer details (such as eye glasses), MimicGAN correspondingly adds them to the
estimated solution.
3 Proposed Approach
In this section, we present details of MimicGAN, an en-
tirely unsupervised approach that uses a surrogate to com-
pensate for the lack of knowledge about f , and a pre-
trained generative model (GAN) to determine plausible
solutions on the image manifold.
Problem Formulation: Let us denote a set of N ob-
served images as Yobs ∈ RN×d where each column
Y obsj ∈ Rd denotes an independent observation. We as-
sume that each Y obsj is a corrupted version of the clean
image Xj ∈ X ⊂ RM . Here X denotes the image space,
and without loss of generality, we assume d ≤ M . The
observations are obtained through an unknown corruption
f , i.e., Y obsj = f (Xj) + η. Here η represents noise in the
measurement process. The goal is to recover an estimate
of the clean image Xˆj from its observation Y obsj without
any knowledge of f , and very few observations.
When the corruption f is known the recovery problem can
be formulated as:
argmin
{Xj∈RM}Nj=1
N∑
j=1
L (Y obsj , f(Xj))+ λR(Xj), (1)
where L denotes the loss function,R is an analytical regu-
larizer and λ is a penalty for the regularization term. The
hope of solving a regularized optimization problem is that
regularization R will lead to a plausible solution in X .
Recently, this regularization has been effectively realized
using a GAN, referred to as the GAN prior [4, 6, 27, 30],
which restricts the solution to lie on a known image man-
ifold. Formally, this can be expressed as G : z 7→ X ,
where G denotes the generator from a pre-trained GAN
and z ∈ RK is the latent noise vector.
3.1 Corruption-Mimicking as a Regular-
izer
MimicGAN is a test-time only system that can solve in-
verse problems without any supervision. It uses a neural
network to mimic the unknown corruption process f , with
a plausible estimate of the clean image in X (parameter-
ized by G). Denoting the estimated corruption from the
surrogate by fˆ , we hypothesize that fˆ can effectively regu-
larize the search on the image manifold and help recover
a better clean image. Similarly, an estimate of the clean
image Xˆj from G can be utilized to update the network
parameters of the surrogate. This alternating optimization
progresses by incrementally refining the surrogate, while
ensuring that there always exists a valid solution Xˆj ∈ X ,
such that fˆ(Xˆj) ≈ Y obsj . The networks in the GAN are
kept frozen in the entire optimization loop. Figure 2a
demonstrates this process for an example case, and Figure
4
2b shows how the estimated solution improves, in terms of
PSNR, with each iteration of the alternating optimization
loop.
Note that, in contrast to other data-driven inversion meth-
ods, we approximate the forward process f instead of the
inverse f†. This formulation is applicable regardless of
the form of f , and can be generalized to a large class of
corruptions on the fly. Mathematically, we reformulate (1)
as follows:
fˆ , {zˆj}Nj=1 = argmin
f,{zj∈RN×K}Nj=1
N∑
j=1
L (Y obsj , f(G(zj))) ,
(2)
where we have Xˆj = G(zˆj). Since both G and f are dif-
ferentiable, we can evaluate the gradients of the objective
in (2), using backpropagation and use existing gradient
based optimizers. In addition to computing gradients with
respect to zj , we also perform clipping in order to restrict
it within the desired range (e.g., [−1, 1]) resulting in a pro-
jected gradient descent (PGD) optimization. Solving this
alternating optimization problem produces high quality
estimates for both surrogate, fˆ and the latent vectors for
the recovered images, Xˆj = G(zˆj) ∀j.
Architecture: The number of observations N required
by MimicGAN depends on the corruption f , but for all
the corruptions considered here, N can be as low as 25
samples. We implement the surrogate using a shallow
network with 3 layers and 16 convolutional filters of size
5× 5 in each layer. We use ReLU activations and a final
masking operation that is also learned (see supplementary
for details). Given the highly underdetermined nature of
these inverse problems, in many cases the surrogate does
not emulate the corruption exactly. Nevertheless, including
the surrogate sufficiently regularizes the inversion. The
balance between updating the surrogate and re-estimating
the clean image using PGD is crucial for the algorithm to
converge. Since the surrogate is updated using a different
set of images in each iteration (due to updates in zˆj), it
does not overfit easily. However, we note that, overfitting
can occur when: (a) the surrogate is very deep, or (b)
the balance between the two optimization loops is poorly
chosen. In such cases, the surrogate causes (2) to converge
prematurely, without providing useful gradients to update
the GAN loop and leading to poor recovery.
Losses: Next we describe the construction of loss function
L in (2), which consists of three different losses:
(a) Corruption mimicking loss: Measures the discrep-
ancy between the observation Y obsj and surrogate’s
prediction, Lobs =
∑N
j=1
∥∥Y obsj − f(G(zj))∥∥1,
where ‖.‖1 is the `1 norm.
(b) Adversarial loss: Using the discriminator D and the
generator G from the pre-trained GAN, we measure:
Ladv =
∑N
j=1 log(1 − D(G(zj)). Note, this is the
same as the generator loss used for training a GAN.
(c) Identity loss: In many cases such as inpainting,
only a part of the original image is corrupted, and
this loss exploits that information to guide fˆ to
converge closer to an identity transformation: LI =∑N
j=1
{‖Y obsj − G(zj)‖1 + ‖f(G(zj))− G(zj)‖}.
Naturally, this does not always help and can be
avoided in cases where no part of the observed image
exactly reproduces the clean image.
Our overall loss is hence defined as:
L = Lobs + λadvLadv + λILI , (3)
where λI , λadv are hyperparameters and can vary depend-
ing on the corruption type. Note that, the projected gra-
dient descent (PGD) technique [30, 25] can be viewed as
a special case of our approach, when f = I, where I is
identity, and λI = 0.
Initialization: MimicGAN depends on an initial seed to
begin the alternating optimization, and we observed varia-
tions in convergence behavior due to the choice of a poor
seed. In order to avoid this, we initialize the estimate of
the clean images by computing an average sample on the
image manifold, by averaging 1000 samples drawn from
the random uniform distribution. Note that, we initialize
the estimate for all observations with the same mean image.
We observe that this not only speeds up convergence, but
is also stable across several random seeds.
Algorithm: The procedure to perform the alternating opti-
mization is shown in Algorithm 1. We run the inner loops
for updating the surrogate and zj for T1 and T2 iterations
respectively. The projection operation denoted by P is the
clipping operation, where we restrict the zj’s to lie within
[−1, 1]. We use the RMSProp Optimizer to perform the
gradient descent step in each case, with learning rates of
γs, γg for the surrogate update and GAN sample update
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respectively. Note that, since our approach requires only
the observations Yobs to perform inversion, it lends itself
to a task-agnostic inference wherein the user does not need
to specify the type of corruption or collect a large dataset
a priori.
Algorithm 1: MimicGAN
Input : Observations Yobs ∈ RN×d, Pre-trained
generator G and discriminator D.
Output : Recovered Images Xˆ ∈ RN×M , Surrogate
fˆ
Initialize : For all j, zˆj is set as average of 1000
realizations drawn from U(−1, 1)// see
text
Initialize :Random initialization of surrogate
parameters, Θˆ
for t← 1 to T do
for t1 ← 1 to T1 // update surrogate
do
Y estj ← fˆ
(
G(zˆj); Θˆ
)
, ∀j;
Compute loss L using (3);
Θˆ← Θˆ− γs ∇Θ(L);
end
for t2 ← 1 to T2 // perform inversion
do
Y estj ← fˆ
(
G(zˆj); Θˆ
)
, ∀j;
Compute loss L using (3);
zˆj ← zˆj − γg ∇z(L), ∀j;
zˆj ← P (zˆj) ∀j;
end
end
return fˆ , Xˆj = G(zˆj), ∀j.
4 Experiments
In this section we present evaluations for MimicGAN in
blind image recovery and adversarial defense, and demon-
strate its superiority over existing approaches. All our
experiments are implemented using TensorFlow [2].
4.1 Blind Image Recovery
Blind image recovery is the process of jointly estimat-
ing both the original image and the corruption, with no
prior knowledge about the corruption process. Conse-
quently, most existing solutions that are tuned for a specific
corruption and cannot do blind image recovery. Mimic-
GAN does not make any such assumptions, and hence is
broadly applicable to several types of corruptions. Here,
we consider 6 challenging image corruptions, which are
described briefly next. Details on their implementations
can be found in the supplementary material. We have cho-
sen these representative tasks to demonstrate the ability
of MimicGAN in recovering highly plausible solutions
to severely ill-conditioned problems; however we believe
MimicGAN can effectively recover a very large class of
linear and non-linear image deformations.
The tasks considered here are:
1. Gray Blur: Extreme blur (scale = 25), followed by
converting the RGB image to grayscale.
2. Stylize: OpenCV’s stylization filtering, followed by
adding Gaussian noise to top 10% of the brightest
image pixels (σ = 0.5).
3. Stuck Pixels: Choose a column close to the middle,
and replace all preceding columns with it. In addition,
we add Gaussian noise to the pixels that have been
replaced (σ = 0.5).
4. Negative: Blur the image (scale = 11), followed up
inverting the RGB values.
5. Extreme Occlusion: Cover the regions of face, eyes,
nose and mouth with Gaussian noise (σ = 0.5).
6. Inpainting: We overlay a pattern of lines (width =
4 pixels) on the image, with values drawn from a
Gaussian distribution (σ = 0.5).
In all the scenarios, we assume no knowledge of the mea-
surement process, and attempt to estimate the surrogate fˆ
and the clean signal jointly.
Experimental Setup: All our image recovery experi-
ments were carried out using the CelebA dataset [17],
which contains 202,599 images of size 64×64. We trained
a DCGAN [23] 90% of the images from CelebA as the
GAN inside MimicGAN. We also rescale all the images
to be in the range of [−1, 1]. The validation set consisting
of 10% of the dataset is used in all the recovery experi-
ments. Details on all the model architectures are available
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Figure 3: Image Recovery on the CelebA dataset with MimicGAN. Six tasks are shown here, in each case the rows represent the
following: Observed, Estimated Corruption, Supervised Solution, PGD, Proposed. With no additional training or data requirements,
we show an improvement of around ∼ 3− 4dB improvement over PGD.
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in the supplementary material. All recovery experiments
for MimicGAN were carried out with N = 25 observa-
tions. The hyperparameters for all the tasks are shown in
table 1. For the Extreme Occlusion and Inpainting tasks,
we use TanH in the last layer instead of the ReLU activa-
tion.
Task λI λadv γs γg
Gray Blur 0 0 2e−4 1e−3
Stylize 0 0 8e−5 4e−4
Negative 0 1e−4 1e−3 1e−3
Stuck Pixels 1e−1 1e−4 4e−3 3e−3
Occlusion 1e−1 1e−4 4e−3 3e−3
Inpainting 1e−1 1e−4 4e−3 3e−3
Table 1: Hyperparameters: See section 3 for details on each
parameter.λI , λadv are regularization parameters (see (3)), and
γs, γg are the learning rates for the surrogate and finding samples
on the GAN, respectively (See alg 1).
Baselines: We compare our technique with the follow-
ing baselines: (a) Supervised: We train a separate net-
work for each recovery task, using paired corrupted-clean
data. During training, we include an adversarial loss with
λadv = 1e−3 in order to produce more realistic solutions.
Though supervised methods are known to be highly effec-
tive, their requirement for enough labeled examples can
be unrealistic. Images recovered using our unsupervised
approach are close to those obtained by the supervised
counterparts; (b) PGD: Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
used in [4, 6, 27, 30] is a special case of our method when
the f is considered to be identity, and hence MimicGAN is
lower-bounded by the performance of PGD. While this
baseline is surprisingly effective with a variety of corrup-
tions, we find that it is easily susceptible to failure.
Results: Examples of the recovered images from all the
tasks are shown in Figure 3. Along with the reconstruc-
tions, we also show PSNR values for each case. It should
be noted that PSNR is not a reliable performance metric
and can be uncorrelated with the visual perception. How-
ever, we still significantly outperform PGD in terms of
PSNR, while producing visually good quality reconstruc-
tions. While existing approaches rely predominantly on
the GAN prior to perform recovery, we show that Mimic-
GAN shows significant performance gains.
4.2 Robust Classification
In several scenarios considered here, PSNR can be a poor
performance metric as it does not capture the ability of
MimicGAN to recover important information or perceptual
quality. Consequently, we quantify the improvement of
our approach using a classification in the wild experiment.
More specifically, we measure how well MimicGAN is
able to recover key attribute information which is useful
for classification. This scenario is becoming increasingly
relevant as classifiers are deployed in the wild, with little
or no control over the test distribution. We perform these
experiments on the Fashion-MNIST [28] dataset, where we
first train a GAN with a similar configuration as DCGAN
(see supplementary for architectural details). Next, using
the same train/validation split used for training the GAN,
we train a convolutional neural network (CNN) classifier
which achieves 91.50% accuracy on a clean test set.
Original Binary
Drop PixelsNegative Blur
(a) A classifier is trained on the original/clean data and tested
under different corruptions shown here
Observed PGD MimicGAN
(Ours)
Binary 37.00 25.50 50.40
Dropped Pixels 25.50 15.60 46.40
Negative Blur 7.20 8.40 45.80
(b) Classification accuracy when test set is corrupted. Test
performance on clean data is 91.50.
Figure 4: Robust Classification: As a pre-processing step,
MimicGAN can make classifiers more robust to arbitrary, un-
known corruptions in the data. Here we report improvement in
accuracy for three different, challenging scenarios.
Since MimicGAN does not require any additional training
or data, it can be used as an unsupervised pre-processing
step to “clean and predict” labels for test data. The goal
of this experiment is to test the generalizability of a pre-
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trained classifier when the test data is corrupted in extreme
ways. To evaluate, we consider 500 random test examples
from the Fashion-MNIST dataset. We corrupt images
using the following techniques: (a) Binary Images: We
transform the images to be binary, using a threshold set at
the 50th percentile value; (b) Drop Pixels: We randomly
drop 70% of the pixels in the images and set them to
0, and (c) Blur + Negative: We blur with a scale of 25,
and invert the images. Examples of images for each of
the corruptions are shown in Figure 4a. We compare our
approach with PGD, and present results in Table 4b. The
first striking observation is the performance degradation
with corrupted test data (91.5% to 7%), while PGD simply
cannot recover images due to the corruptions. On the other
hand, MimicGAN provides robustness to the classifier,
without any additional supervision or data collection.
4.3 Adversarial Defense
In this section we discuss how MimicGAN, by design,
can act as a powerful defense against several adversarial
attacks. The combination of the surrogate along with the
GAN prior can effectively clean adversarial data better than
existing methods. In this context, the MimicGAN defense
can be viewed as a generalization of the recent GAN-based
defenses [25, 12, 26], where the surrogate, fˆ = I, is as-
sumed to be identity, similar to the PGD baseline described
earlier. The Cowboy defense [26] uses an additional ad-
versarial loss term to the defense-GAN loss [25] with the
discriminator (We implement it with λadv = 1e−3). We
consider a wide range of strong attacks to benchmark our
defense, and we find that in every single case the Mimic-
GAN defense is significantly stronger than existing tech-
niques. While we outperform Defense-GAN[25], we retain
its advantages – i.e, the MimicGAN defense is a test-time
only algorithm that does not require any additional train-
ing. We are also entirely unsupervised, and do not need
knowledge of the classifier prior to deploying the defense,
thus leading to a practical defense strategy.
Experimental details: We use the pre-trained a CNN
classifier described in section 4.2 with a test accuracy
of 91.50% on the Fashion-MNIST dataset. We design
a variety of attacks using the cleverhans toolbox [21], and
test our defense on this classifier for all the following
experiments. The performance of MimicGAN defense is
measured using 500 randomly chosen test images from
the dataset, which are cleaned in batches of size 100 for
efficiency.
(a) Universal Perturbations [19]
Attack No
Defense
Cowboy
[26]
Defense
GAN [25]
MimicGAN
(Ours)
DeepFool[20] 06.20 80.20 80.00 85.40
CWL[8] 00.40 67.00 66.20 69.20
BIM[15] 05.60 60.00 58.40 68.00
PGDM[18] 05.40 60.80 58.80 66.40
FGSM[11] 11.60 48.20 46.60 60.00
Obfuscated[5] 23.80 23.80 26.60 33.60
(b) Popular Adversarial Perturbations
Figure 5: Adversarial Defense: MimicGAN defense shows sig-
nificantly higher robustness to several strong adversarial attacks.
Performance on clean test data is 91.5%.
Universal perturbations: MimicGAN provides a natural
defense against universal perturbations [19, 1], which are
a class of image-agnostic perturbations where an attack
is just a single vector which when added to the entire
dataset can fool a classifier. To test this defense, we first
design a targeted universal perturbation using the Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [11], by computing the
mean adversarial perturbation from N = 15 test images,
i.e. for an adversarially perturbed image X˜ , we define the
universal perturbation to be νu =
∑
i(Xi − X˜)/N . We
can also increase the magnitude of the attack by scaling it:
X˜u = X + ανu. Typically, a larger magnitude implies a
stronger attack up to a certain point after which it becomes
noise and reduces to a trivial attack. In Figure 5(a), we
observe that when compared to Defense-GAN, our defense
is significantly more robust.
Image dependent perturbations: We test the Mimic-
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GAN defense against the following image-specific attacks:
(a) The Carlini-Wagner L2 attack (CWL) [8], (b) Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [11], (c) Projected Gra-
dient Descent Method (PGDM) [18], (d) DeepFool [20],
(e) Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [15] and (f) Obfuscated
Gradients [5]. We hypothesize that even though the pertur-
bation on each image is different, the surrogate learns an
average perturbation when presented with a few adversar-
ial examples. As seen in Table 5(b), this turns out to be a
strong regularization, resulting in a significantly improved
defense compared to baseline approaches such as Defense-
GAN [25] or Cowboy [26]. The obfuscated attack [5] is the
strongest attack considered here as it targets the GAN in
addition to the classifier. While MimicGAN is vulnerable
to such an attack, it can afford a stronger defense than plain
GAN-based defenses because of the surrogate, as seen in
table 5(b).
5 Discussion
In this paper, we presented MimicGAN , an entirely unsu-
pervised system that can recover images from unknown cor-
ruptions by introducing a corruption-mimicking surrogate
in addition to a GAN prior. Such a system moves us a step
closer towards a universal solution to inverse problems.
This can lead to the design of image recovery systems that
can be deployed as a pre-processing step for achieving
robust classification in the wild. MimicGAN can recover
realistic images over a wide array of extremely ill-posed
inversion tasks, while being competitive with supervised
approaches. Furthermore, we showed that it improves over
recent GAN-based defenses for adversarial attacks, thereby
producing state-of-the-art defense against the strongest at-
tacks.
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APPENDIX
CelebA Dataset
A Architecture
In this section we provide implementation and architec-
tural details of the various networks used in this paper. For
the CelebA dataset, we use the same generator and discrim-
inator networks specified by DCGAN[23] by modifying
code available online1. For the surrogate network we use
the following network:
Input Operation
(64, 64, 3) Conv (5, 5, 3, 16) + ReLU
(64, 64, 16) Conv (5, 5, 16, 16) + ReLU
(64, 64, 16) Conv (5, 5, 16, dims) + ReLU
(64, 64, dims) Mutiply (64, 64, dims) + TanH
Table 2: CelebA Surrogate
A.1 Corruption Functions
We use six challenging corruptions to test MimicGAN. In
this section we provide implementation details for all of
them.
1. Inpainting:
i m p o r t numpy as np
from np .random i m p o r t randn
d e f inpainting (imgs ) :
mask = np .ones ( ( 6 4 , 6 4 , 3 ) )
sig = 0 . 5
mask [ 4 : 8 , 1 2 : 5 4 , : ] = sig*randn ( 4 , 4 2 , 3 )
mask [ 1 2 : 1 6 , 1 2 : 5 4 , : ] = sig*randn ( 4 , 4 2 , 3 )
mask [ 2 0 : 2 4 , 1 2 : 5 4 , : ] = sig*randn ( 4 , 4 2 , 3 )
mask [ 2 8 : 3 2 , 1 2 : 5 4 , : ] = sig*randn ( 4 , 4 2 , 3 )
mask [ 3 6 : 4 0 , 1 2 : 5 4 , : ] = sig*randn ( 4 , 4 2 , 3 )
mask [ 4 4 : 4 8 , 1 2 : 5 4 , : ] = sig*randn ( 4 , 4 2 , 3 )
mask [ 5 2 : 5 6 , 1 2 : 5 4 , : ] = sig*randn ( 4 , 4 2 , 3 )
mask [ 6 0 : 6 4 , 1 2 : 5 4 , : ] = sig*randn ( 4 , 4 2 , 3 )
img0 = np .array ( [x*mask f o r x i n imgs ] )
r e t u r n img0
2. Occlusion:
i m p o r t numpy as np
from np .random i m p o r t randn
1https://github.com/sugyan/tf-dcgan/blob/
master/dcgan.py
d e f occlusion (imgs ) :
mask = np .ones ( ( 6 4 , 6 4 , 3 ) )
mask [ 2 4 : 4 4 , 1 2 : 5 4 , : ] = 0
mask *= np .transpose (mask , [ 1 , 0 , 2 ] )
img0 = np .array ( [x*mask f o r x i n imgs ] )
img1 = img0 .flatten ( )
idx = np .where (img1==0) [ 0 ]
img1 [idx ] = 0 . 5 *randn ( l e n (idx ) )
r e t u r n img1 .reshape (−1 ,64 ,64 ,3)
3. Pixel Error:
i m p o r t numpy as np
from np .random i m p o r t randn
d e f pixel_error (imgs ) :
img0 = np .copy (imgs )
z = 26
x = img0 [ : , : , [ z ] , : ]
noise = randn (imgs .shape [ 1 ] ,z ,imgs .shape [ 3 ] )
noise = np .tile (noise , [ imgs .shape [ 0 ] , 1 , 1 , 1 ] )
_x = np .tile (x , [ 1 , 1 ,z , 1 ] ) + 0 .25 *noise
img0 [ : , : , : z , : ] = _x
r e t u r n img0
4. Negative:
i m p o r t numpy as np
from np .random i m p o r t randn
from cv2 i m p o r t GaussianBlur as gb
d e f negative (imgs ,scale=25) :
img0 = [ ]
f o r i i n r a n g e (imgs .shape [ 0 ] ) :
z = gb (imgs [i , : , : ] , ( scale ,scale ) , 0 )
img0 .append (z )
r e t u r n 0−np .array (img0 )
5. Stylize:
i m p o r t numpy as np
from np .random i m p o r t randn
i m p o r t np .percentile as perc
from cv2 i m p o r t Stylization as style
d e f stylize (imgs ) :
img0 = np .copy (imgs )
f o r i i n r a n g e (imgs .shape [ 0 ] ) :
src = imgs [i , : , : , : ]
_img = style ( 1 2 7 . 5 * ( 1 +src ) , sigma_s=10 , ←↩
sigma_r= 0 . 8 )
_img2 = np .array (_img ,dtype=np .float32 )←↩
/ 1 2 7 . 5 − 1 .
img0 [i , : , : , : ] = _img2
img1 = img0 .flatten ( )
idx = np .where (img1>perc (img0 , 9 0 ) ) [ 0 ]
img1 [idx ] = perc (img0 , 9 0 ) + 0 . 5 *randn ( l e n (idx ) )
img_style = img1 .reshape (−1 ,64 ,64 ,3)
r e t u r n img_style
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6. Gray Blur:
i m p o r t numpy as np
from cv2 i m p o r t GaussianBlur as gb
i m p o r t cv2
d e f cv_blur (imgsscale=25) :
img0 = [ ]
f o r i i n r a n g e (imgs .shape [ 0 ] ) :
_x = gb (imgs [i , : , : ] , ( 1 5 , 1 5 ) , 0 )
y = np .array ( 1 2 7 . 5 * (_x+1) ,dtype=np .uint8 )
_ ,_x = cv2 .threshold (y , 1 2 0 , 2 5 5 ,cv2 .←↩
THRESH_TRUNC )
z = np .array (_x ,dtype=np .float32 ) /127 .5−1.
img0 .append (z )
r e t u r n np .expand_dims (np .array (img0 ) ,axis=3)
Figure 6: PSNR vs Surrogate loss for all the tasks consid-
ered in this work.
B Additional Results
Here we show additional results obtained using Mimic-
GAN. In figure (6), we show how the surrogate improves
as the solution estimate is update with each iteration of
the alternating optimization loop. In figures (7a), (8a),
(8a), (9a), (9a), and (10a) we show additional results for
blind image recovery on the six tasks considered here. For
definitions of the task please see the experiments section.
For all these results, we use the same hyperparameters
described in the main text, in table 1.
Fashion-MNIST Dataset
C Fashion-MNIST
Here, we outline the different networks used in our
Fashion-MNIST experiments. FC is a fully connected
layer, BN is the batch normalization operation. In each
layer (except masking), we also includes a bias term as
well, not shown in the tables.
Input Operation
(1, 100) FC (100, 1024) + ReLU + BN
(1, 1024) FC (1024, 128 ∗ 7 ∗ 7) + ReLU + BN
(1, 128 ∗ 7 ∗ 7) Reshape
(7, 7, 128) Strided Conv (4, 4, 64, 128) + ReLU
(14, 14, 64) Strided Conv (4, 4, 1, 64) + TanH
Table 3: Fashion-MNIST Generator.
Input Operation
(28, 28, 1) Conv (4, 4, 1, 64) + BN + leaky ReLU
(14, 14, 64) Conv (4, 4, 1, 128) + BN + leaky ReLU
(7, 7, 128) Reshape
(1, 7 ∗ 7 ∗ 128) FC(128 ∗ 7 ∗ 7, 1024) + leaky ReLU + BN
(1, 1024) FC(1024, 1) + Sigmoid
Table 4: Fashion-MNIST Discriminator
Input Operation
(28, 28, 1) Conv (5, 5, 1, 16) + ReLU
(28, 28, 16) Conv (5, 5, 16, 1) + ReLU
(28, 28, 1) Multiply mask (28, 28, 1)
(28, 28, 1) Add + W*Input
Table 5: Fashion-MNIST Surrogate
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(a) Results for Gray Blur.
Figure 7: Addtional Results
(a) Results for Stylize.
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(a) Results for Negative.
Figure 8: Addtional Results
(a) Results for Pixel Error.
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(a) Results for Occlusion.
Figure 9: Addtional Results
(a) Results for Inpainting.
Figure 10: Addtional Results
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